[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti
kuntimaddi sadananda
kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Wed Jul 8 21:53:15 CDT 2015
Venkataraghavanji - PraNAms.
Yes you are right.
Hari Om!
Sadananda
--------------------------------------------
On Wed, 7/8/15, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti
To: "kuntimaddi sadananda" <kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com>
Cc: "A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta" <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
Date: Wednesday, July 8, 2015, 11:36 AM
Sri SadAji
PraNams.
I am
not disputing the nature of the bhAga tyAga process, or that
devadatta
has attributes or not. As stated
previously, I do agree that devadatta has
attributes.
The meaning of the sentence is simply that
there is an underlying
devadatta. Until we
have performed bhAga tyAga we don't know what those
common attributes are, but the knowledge that
there is a common devadatta
implied by the
sentence is not the same as the knowledge of such a
devadatta's attributes. Knowledge and
verification of that knowledge are
two
different steps.
Regards,
Venkatraghavan
On
Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 3:37 PM, kuntimaddi sadananda <
kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com>
wrote:
> Shree
Venkataraghavan - PraNAms - in the bhaagatyaaga lakshana
only the
> contradictory attributes are
dropped and not those that are common for this
> and that Devadatta. Some saadRisyam has to
be there for validation of
> oneness of
Devadatta. At least the name is common here. If every
attribute
> is dropped then this
Devadatta could also be that yagnadatta too!
>
> In the case of tat
tvam asi - the existence part is not negated existence
> as this and that -only contradictory
attributes that appear to invalidate
>
the equation are dropped and not to the common ones.
>
> Bhagavan Ramana puts
this as
> Isha jeevayoH veshadhee bhidaa,
satva bhaavato vastu kevalam. The costumes
> that Iswara and Jeeva wearing are only
different but from the existence
> part
is not dropped.
>
>
Hari Om!
> Sadananda
>
>
--------------------------------------------
> On Wed, 7/8/15, Venkatraghavan S via
Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
wrote:
>
> Subject:
Re: [Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti
>
To: "Bhaskar YR" <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
> Cc: "A discussion group for Advaita
Vedanta" <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
> Date: Wednesday, July 8, 2015, 6:38
AM
>
> Sri
Bhaskar-ji,
> Namaste and thanks for
the email.
>
> I am
not disputing that the
> common
devadatta has attributes - he/she/it
>
clearly does. I am simply saying that the
> sentence "this is that" is
not
> conveying any attributes, and the
knowledge
> generated by the sentence*
does
> not contain
> any attributive content about that
common devadatta*.
>
> Regards,
>
Venkat
>
>
> On
> Wed, Jul 8,
2015 at 11:15 AM, Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
> wrote:
>
> > PraNAms Sri
> Venkatraghavan prabhuji
> >
> > Hare
Krishna
> >
>
> Ø At the risk of stretching this
> analogy, let me share my thoughts
with
> >
>
you.
> >
> >
The question
> was if it is possible to
cognize an object without its
> >
attributes.
> >
> > The answer in certain cases,
like
> "soyam devadatta", you
can. Please
> > consider the
sentence soyam devadatta,
> leaving all
notions of whatever or
> >
> whoever devadatta is.
> >
> > What
does that sentence, taken in
>
isolation, convey? Do we know, just by
> >
> that
sentence, if devadatta is a man, a woman, a dog, an
> alien? We don't.
> >
> > The
sentence simply conveys that there is
>
an object called devadatta,
> >
which is
> commonly referred to by the
sa: and ayam padAs.
> >
> > Ø Yes,
> that sentence would simply convey that
there exists some
> object
> > by some ‘particular’ name
> (‘devadatta’ in this example) on
which I donot
> > know anything.
> >
> > Because
we don't know the attributes
> of
devadatta, can we say that no
> >
> knowledge whatsoever is produced by the
sentence?
> >
>
> We cannot, because
> that sentence
produces knowledge that there is such a
> > common object referred to by sa:
and ayam,
> we just dont know what
exactly
> >
>
he/she/it is.
> >
> >
>
Ø As Sri Keshava Prasad prabhuji observed,
> normally an inquisitive mind
> > does not
>
stop by mere getting the knowledge that there is
something
> out
>
> there!! Though knowing something
> more on that something exists is a
> >
> subsequent
process, as soon as some object has been pointed
> and addressed
>
> ‘this’ object is
>
‘that’, our mind would grasp this sentence with some
> > attributes only, it may be either
way,
> wrong or right immaterial here,
but
> >
>
invariably our mind associates some attribute to
‘this’
> to know that ‘this’
> > is nothing but
> ‘that’. We may recall here
shankara’s observation
> in
> > bruhadAraNyaka here with regard
to
> ‘drum sound’ ( in second
adhyAya!!?? Not
> > sure). Here
shankara clarifies by
> grasping the
genus sound as produced by
> >
> the beat of the drum, that species
underlying it are also
> grasped,
but
> > ‘they cannot be grasped
> as distinct from that genus’. For as
species they
> > have no independent
existence. If we
> apply this rule to
this particular
> >
> example, this and that devadatta must
have some underlying
> common genus
> > through which this
> devadatta has been equated with that
devadatta. And
> > without this
common underlying devadatta
> there
cannot be independent
> >
existence
> for both ‘this’ and
that devadatta. Hence, this
>
underlying
> > common genus
(called
> devadutta who is common in
both this & that) must be
> >
recognized first to declare that this is
> that devadatta. This recognition
> > need
> not be
directly related to currently perceiving attributes
> of object
> >
(this devadatta) nor it is
>
necessary that it should have the similarity
> > with the previously cognized
‘that’
> devadutta, but what needs
to be there
> >
> is some commonality which can be termed
as attributes to
> correctly
identify
> > the devadatta. I
> think this commonality what Sri Ananda
Hudli observed
> > while narrating
his observation, he said
> :
> >
> >
> >
> >
//quote//
> >
>
> Both the Devadatta
> seen now as
"this" and the Devadatta seen earlier
> as
> >
"that" have attributes.
>
They are both men, with parts such as hands, feet,
> > etc. What is going on here?
> >
> >
Although Devadatta is
> very much a
perceivable person with attributes, the
> > crucial point here is that the
perception
> "this is that
Devadatta" does not
> > involve
any of those attributes. It is
>
exactly expressing an identity
> >
between
> two objects, this Devadatta
and that Devadatta, nothing
> less,
> > nothing more. So there is no
> "appeal" made to any attribute
in the
> > knowledge "this is
that
> Devadatta", although
Devadatta does have attributes.
>
>
> > //unquote//
> >
> >
> >
> > So,
bottom line is
> ‘devadatta’ (any
object) does have the attributes
>
which
> > is common in both this
& that
> but directly not related
in raising the
> >
> knowledge i.e. this is that
devadatta.
> >
> >
> >
> > Hari Hari Hari
> Bol!!!
> >
> > bhaskar
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
> Archives: http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/
> http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.culture.religion.advaita
>
> To unsubscribe or
change your
> options:
> http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/cgi-bin/listinfo/advaita-l
>
> For assistance,
contact:
> listmaster at advaita-vedanta.org
>
>
_______________________________________________
Archives: http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/
http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.culture.religion.advaita
To unsubscribe or change your
options:
http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/cgi-bin/listinfo/advaita-l
For assistance, contact:
listmaster at advaita-vedanta.org
More information about the Advaita-l mailing list