[Advaita-l] Shruti prAmANya and jnAna

[Venkatraghavan S]

For pUrva mImAmsa and advaita vedAnta, the truth or validity of any
cognition is intrinsic (svatah prAmANya), but error is due to certain
vitiating external conditions of cognition (paratah aprAmANya). Therefore
any cognition is true so far as it reveals its object and is known to be
true so far as it is uncontradicted (abAdhita) - so the absence of
contradiction is a negative condition of truth.

The falsity of cognitions is due to some defects in the conditions out of
which the cognitions arise. A visual perception becomes false when its
normal conditions are vitiated by poor eyesight, light etc. Just as a
cognition is false due to external conditions, it is known to be false
through the experience of contradiction and knowledge of the vitiating
conditions. So the falsity of the rope-snake is known when it is
contradicted by the subsequent experience of the rope.

svatah prAmANyavAda is linked with the justification for the apaurusheyatva
of veda. The mImAmsaka's view of vedas is that they are unauthored, whether
by a human or divine agency (apaurusheya). If they were authored by a human
agency, then the problem they would face is that the defects of the author
would be present in his creation, and hence the validity of Vedas would be
called into question. If they were authored by a divine, omniscient God (as
argued by the naiyyAyikAs), then the validity of scripture would be
dependent on the existence and omniscience of God. This, the naiyyAyikas
tries to prove by logic, but that proof has logical errors. Again, the
validity of Vedas is called into question. To get around this problem, two
things are done: 1) it is postulated that the Vedas are apaurusheya and 2)
 the intrinsic validity of pramANa in general is postulated (svatah
prAmANya), which is then extended and generalised to cover the Veda as an
independent pramANa.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan

On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 9:16 PM, Srinath Vedagarbha <svedagarbha at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 8:46 AM, श्रीमल्ललितालालितः via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Another thing to consider, there are two types of prAmANya, tested and
>> otherwise.
>> Tested one needs all what I said. Untested is svataH and is saved by
>> apauruSheyatva.
>>
>>
> There are no such thing as two types of prAmANya. It is either prAmANya or
> aprAmANya.
>
> If you argue one of the prAmANya is tested one, then there is no
> difference between your position and a bhOudhAs -- for whom prAmANya is
> parataH. Then anavasthA dOSha will be applicable with equal force.
>
> All schools in vEdAnta agrees prAmANya is svataH only, whether it is
> comprehended via channels of pratyaksha or anumAna or shabda (or other type
> for different schools)
>
> Btw, how does advaitins justify apauruSheyatva concept in general? The
> reason I am asking is that when this entire jagat is considered as arOpita
> and a brAnti, and it is partiyOgi for niShEda, then is there any real
> meaning for apauruSheyatva or otherwise? apauruSheyatva make sense only for
> someone who is realists. One cannot argue apauruSheyatva is valid now (in
> vyavahAra) but not later. Let's not forget, this jagat is pratiyOgi for
> negation in all three time frames  (trikAlika-nishEdha) including in this
> vyavahAra. So there is no point in arguing apauruSheyatva is valid now but
> not later. There is no temporal aspect to validity itself. If something is
> found/attested to be valid (via svatastva route) it is valid always. If
> there is no niSchaya in its validity to begin with, it may be rendered
> aprAmANya later, that is ok.  But cannot get invalidated after it has got
> such niSchayatva.
>
> Has this issue been addressed in any classical works?
>
> /sv
>
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