[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-511 to 1-524

[Anand Hudli]

On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:25 AM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Anandaji - PraNAms
> Just a comment for clarification based on my understanding.
> Formation of vRitti in the pratyaksha pramaana involves sense input.
> Senses that go with the mind to the obeject can only cognize the reflected
> attributes of the object since attributes are inseparable from their locus.
> If the senses are defective as in person who is color blind, then the sense
> input to the mind is defective as it does not reflects true attributes of
> the obejct. Erronious perception can occur due to defective or incomplete
> attributive content in the formation of the vRitti in the mind.
> When I perceive an object, the vRitti of the object that forms in the mind
> contains the (form) ruupa or other attributes of the object that the senses
> can sense. The object is identified as pot if I have a pot knowledge before
> which is stored in memory. The cognition and recognition both are involved
> in the knowledge that this is  a pot. anadigatatvam here involves only
> cognition of the existence of the object, pot, via perceptual processes
> which could not happen until I see. Recognition has to come from memory
> only.
> If I am seeing the pot for the first time (in essence I have no knowledge
> of the pot in my memory) then anadigatatvam ends with the knowledge that -
> here is an object, which some form, and I do not know what this is. If my
> mother or teacher tells me that - this is pot - then only I have knowledge
> of object with its attributive content (rupa), and a name or naama for the
> form that I perceive. Hence nemability involves knowability. Jagat is naama
> ruupatmakam - since knowability is also included as the existence of an
> object is established only the knowledge of its existence. Of course, if an
> object looks similar to something that I know, then upamana pramana
> operates, but that is not complete knowledge of the object.  Hence even in
> perception memory to some extent operates not in the cognition but in the
> recognition. Ignorance has two aspects - one is removed by cognition and
> the other by recognition from memory. Not sure which one pertains to the
> bhaava ruupa ajnaana here.
> Just recollection from memory - if somebody says POT - visualition of a
> pot in the mind- does not involve sense input - hence it is separated from
> pratyaksha pramaana.
> Some Vedantins try to separate the two steps as indeterminate vs
> determinate perceptions.
> Just my 2c
> Hari Om!Sadananda

Dear Shri Sadanandaji,
Just to make a quick couple of observations based on what you wrote, the
Vedanta paribhAShA deals with the topic of "dhArAvAhikabuddhi" and says
that if there is a series of cognitions resulting from perceiving an
object, it should be treated as a single cognition. However, a question may
be raised as to how to treat seeing an object, say a pot, for the first
time and then after an interval of time seeing it again, seeing the same
pot in a different place, etc. Do we mean to say that the second (and
subsequent cognitions) are not pramA, but only the first one? The solution
to this lies in introducing the space-time complex as part of the
perception. The second and subsequent cognitions of the same object brought
about by the PratyakSha pramANa are indeed valid cognitions, because the
space-time complex varies from one cognition to another. Thus every valid
cognition has some element of anadhigatatva. For instance, if I see a pot
now and see the same pot an hour later, the second cognition is also new,
since the time factor is different from the first cognition. (One could
argue that because I see a pot now does not guarantee that it will be there
after an hour and in that sense seeing it again after an hour is new
information.) Or, I may see a pot now and see the same pot in another place
an hour later. In this case, both the space and time factors differ from
the first cognition.

Also, the concepts of savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perceptions are treated
in the Vedanta ParibhASha as well.

Anand


On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com> wrote:

> >To this, Sri brahmAnandA says, yes mahAvAkya has avidyA apeksha, but here
> >the apekshA of avidyA is not as a doSha. For example, a jaundiced patient,
> >In whose driShTi, everything is yellow goes to a doctor. The doctor
> >correctly diagnoses the patient. The doctor's knowledge (ie diagnosis) has
> >an apekshA of pittam in the patient, but pittam is not a doSha for the
> >doctor himself. So while the presence of pittam is a requirement for the
> >doctor's jnAna, it is not capable of rendering the doctor's jnAna faulty,
> >In the same manner as it affects patient's chakshu jnAna. In a similar
> way,
> >mahAvAkya has an apekshA for avidyA, but that avidyA is not as a doSha
> that
> >affects the tAttvikatva of its viShaya.
>
> Incidentally, the definition of "anadhigatatva" also addresses the issue
> of how there is an apekShA of ajnAna for a pramA (valid cognition) to
> arise. This is found in the excellent commentary by MM Shri Anantakrishna
> Sastri on the VedAnta ParibhAShA. Says he:
> ayaM ghaTa ityAdau svakShANa eva ajnAnasya ajnAnaviShayatAyA vA nivRttiH
> na tu sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNa iti ghaTAdiranadhigata eva| smRtau tu
> saMskArodbodhasyApi ajnAnaviShaytAnivartakatvasya dvitIyamithyAtve
> brahmAnandasarasvatIbhiruktatvAt sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNe ghaTo nAjnAta
> iti nAtivyAptiH| vastutastu svapUrvasvakaraNakShaNAvacchinnAjnAnaviShayatvameva
> anadhigatatvam ...
>
> In cognitions such as "This is a pot", the ignorance (of the pot) or the
> content of the ignorance are destroyed at the moment when the pot-cognition
> arises, but (the ignorance) is not destroyed during the immediately
> preceding moment. Hence, the pot is (previously) unknown. In the case of
> memory (recollection), although it destroys the content of ignorance, as
> BrahmAnanda-sarasvatI has said in the second definition of mithyAtva in the
> advaita-siddhi, the pot is not unknown during the immediately preceding
> moment. Hence, the definition is not too wide. In fact, the prevalence of
> ignorance and its content during the preceding moment when the (pramANa)
> karaNa operates is defined as anadhigatatvam, ie. being previously unknown.
>
> Perhaps this requires further explanation for those who are not familiar
> with the way how advaitins view the production of knowledge of an object
> through a pramANa. The knowledge arises as a vRtti in the mind, after the
> ignorance of the object has been destroyed. It is necessary for this
> ignorance of the object to exist before its destruction through the
> operation of a pramANa and to be called an anadhigata object. Since
> advaitins also hold that this ignorance is bhAva-rUpa, i.e. a "positive"
> entity, they are not talking about the destruction of a mere absence or
> nonexistent entity. This bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, say pot, must be
> destroyed in order for the knowledge of the pot to arise as a vRtti in the
> mind. Now, this bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna exists for a previously unknown object,
> and through operation of a pramANa, it gets destroyed and replaced by the
> knowledge of the object. However, in the case of a mere recollection or
> memory of an object, the object is not previously unknown, and hence, the
> bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of the object does not exist, which means the necessary
> condition for anadhigatatva is absent.
>
> In short, without the bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, the object cannot be
> revealed by a pramANa, and a pramA (valid knowledge) of the object cannot
> arise. It can, however, be recollected as a case of memory, without the
> need for a pramANa.
>
> Anand
>
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Dear Shri Venkatraghavanji,
>>
>> >Re the above, Sri vAdirAja's question is if the pramANa viShaya is
>> >vyAvahArikam, it is by definition bAdhyam upon brahma jnAna. pramANa
>> >according to advaitins is abAdhitArtha viShayatvam, so by definition, all
>> >the shruti vAkya that have vyAvahArika vastu as their viShaya are not
>> >pramANas. This point by vAdirAja is valid in my opinion, but is not a
>>  > problem for advaita.
>>
>> One of the necessary conditions for a source of knowledge to be called a
>> pramANa is that it should make things known that are not already known
>> (anadhigata). What happens in this case can be examined in two phases. In
>> the phase before the dawn of Brahman knowledge, both abheda and bheda
>> shrutis are pramANas, since we are still in the vyAvahArika phase and there
>> is no sublation of vyAvahArika objects. After the dawn of Brahman
>> knowledge, *both* abheda and bheda shrutis, ie. the whole shruti itself,
>> becomes atattvAvedaka and ceases to be a pramANa, since it cannot make any
>> thing known that is not already known. So what I am saying is that we have
>> either a situation where 1) both bheda and abheda shrutis are tattvAvedaka
>> or where 2) both abheda and bheda shrutis are atattvAvedaka. The charge by
>> VAdirAja is that one type of shruti is tattvAvedaka and another is
>> atattvAvedaka, as per the advaitin. But as we have have seen, we will never
>> be in that situation.
>>
>> Anand
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> As explained in the vedAnta-paribhAShA, the validity (prAmANya) of
>>> pramANas is of two kinds. vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedakatva is the
>>> capability to make known vyAvahArika reality.
>>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedakatva is the capability to make known the Absolute
>>> reality, Brahman. The first kind belongs to pramANas other than the one
>>> which yields BrahmajnAna, whereas the second kind belongs only to
>>> statements (shruti texts) that teach the unity of jIva and Brahman, for
>>> example, sadeva somyedamagra AsIt, tattvamasi, etc. This implies that Bheda
>>> shrutis belong to the category of vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas,
>>> while the abheda-shrutis belong to the category of
>>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas. However, it is also clear that
>>> advaitins do not state there is an atattvAvedaka pramANa in the Veda, as
>>> alleged by VAdirAja. If they had indeed stated that a part of the Veda is
>>> atattvAvedaka while another part is tattvAvedaka there would have been
>>> shrutahAni surely, but they did not. advaitins do agree that every shruti
>>> is tattvAvedaka, although the tattva that it conveys could be vyAvahArika
>>> or pAramArthika. The topic of Bheda-shrutis vis a vis the abheda-shrutis is
>>> discussed in detail in the advaitasiddhi. Suffice it to say that one
>>> solution is to accept Bheda-shrutis, those vAkyas of the shruti that seem
>>> to deal with duality, as describing vyAvahArika bheda, since there cannot
>>> be be any bheda at the pAramArthika level. Bheda shrutis play a role
>>> similar to the role played by arthavAdas in the context of a vidhi, vide
>>> the mImAMsA sUtra - vidhinA tu ekavAkyatvAt stutyarthatvena vidhInAM syuH,
>>> 1.2.7. Just as arthavAda vAkyas are not independent pramANas but do
>>> help by supporting and commending the enjoined act (vidhi), bheda-shrutis
>>> too serve the purpose of supporting the abheda-shrutis. Taken
>>> independently, they are not pramANas for revealing Brahman. Hence, there is
>>> no shrutahani.
>>>
>>> Anand
>>>
>>>
>>
>