[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-605 to 1-627

Srinath Vedagarbha svedagarbha at gmail.com
Fri Jun 30 16:10:23 EDT 2017

On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 1:23 PM, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Praveen R. Bhat via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> > Namaste Venkatraghavanji,
> >
> > On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
> > advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > To be fair, Srinath ji will argue that earlier he was postulating the
> > > *necessity of the knowledge* of pratiyogi for *knowing the difference*
> > from
> > > that object, whereas now he is *ruling out the necessity of the
> > existence*
> > > of the pratiyogi for the *existence* of bhedA with  it.
> > >
> > > ​
> > Thanks for that interesting insight.
> > ​ To make that statement, we can fairly assume that such bhedaH is
> > knowable. How can existence of bhedaH with a non-existent pratiyogin be
> > known until the non-existence of the pratiyogin is known?
> >
> I have learnt that Madhva has raised this question on the Advaitin's
> 'asadvilakṣaṇam' part of (sadasadvilakshanam) definition for a mithya
> vastu.

It is only AV's paxa that asat cannot be known 'asat chEt na pratIyata'.
Dvaitins do not subscribe to that position. Both sat and asat (or bhAva and
abhAva) can be known using all three pramANa-s.

Madhva's argument on AV is that -- if AV's position is that asat cannot be
known ( this is part of sat chEt na bAdhita asat chEta na pratIyata) , then
how do the posit the bEdha from asat in their definition of
sadAsadvilaxaNaM for this world?  The vilaxaNattvaM (difference) cannot be
known unless pratiyOgi asat is known. But by AV's definition asat is
unknowable, yet vilaxaNattvaM is porsulated. That is the issue raised.

This is not an issue for Dvaitins, for asat is knowable just as sat vastu.
In case of vandyAputra it is known because of contradiction of terms used.
In the case of shashashringa, it is known so because lack of pratyaksha to
be other way (anupalabdhi in your case)

> Since even Madhva has accepted his shukti-rajata to be atyanta asat,
> like shasha vishana, this objection is applicable for them too.  See what
> they have to say about their theory of error:
> //The mAdhvas also introduce a new concept, i.e. that of a similar
> entity, sadrisha,
> that is a real entity, as explained below. What is to be noted is that
> unreality is now of *two* types - adhyasta or superimposed, and tuchchha or
> fictitious. An example of the adhyasta type is the silver that is
> superimposed on nacre during an illusion or a snake that is superimposed on
> a piece of rope. An example of the tuchchha entity is, of course, a hare's
> horn (shashashringa), a chimera that never exists. It is important to note,
> right at the outset that according to Vyasatirtha's definition, there are
> *two* types of unreality (falsity), namely the adhyasta and the tuchchha
> (alIka). So neither a superimposed object such as silver on nacre nor a
> hare's horn exist at any time at any place. They are both considered as
> asat.//
> See for more details here, an old post by Sri Anand Hudli:


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