[Advaita-l] Who has Ajnana/Maya?
Praveen R. Bhat
bhatpraveen at gmail.com
Sat Mar 18 02:08:18 EDT 2017
On Sat, Mar 18, 2017 at 8:03 AM, Kalyan <kalyan_kg at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > //Where do you get
> Atman is vyAvahArika satya from my statement?!//
> I did not say Atman is vyavaharika satya. I said Atman being affected by
> misery is vyavaharika satya, as per your statements.
That is iShTApatti for AV. vyAvahArika does not affect pAramArthika.
Few questions - to whom does it appear?
To whoever it appears, it appears. Please express your understanding of
"Atman being affected by misery". That is exactly to who it appears, to him
is the bandhana and mokSha both.
How is moksha final when the Atman is prone to ignorance?
Again, Atman is not prone to ignorance. In your own words, "Atman
affected by misery", is prone to ignorance.
What guarantees that the Atman does not come back into vyavaharika
> ignorance again, yet remaining pure in paramarthika?
The same thing guarantees that there was no vyAvahArika ignorance for the
pAramArthika Atman. If there was ignorance, there would be mokSha. So the
question will not arise, if mokSha is not *attained* at all, for it to go.
Why does the world not disappear when the one Atman attains moksha?
Why should it? Atman is always mukta. Why did it appear to go? That is
how it is. The svarUpa of Maya is to project; why does the sun does not
stop to appear as rising when I understand it doesn't rise at all?
> After all, one Atman can come out of ignorance only once. How then do we
> have multiple jIvanmuktas?
The jivanmukta that you indicate is one with the prArabdhaleSha, that is
not the ekamevAdvitiyAtman you see as many. If the Atman is jivan and
mukta, then it is jivanmukta, but Atman is nityamukta, is it jivan for it
to be jivanmukta?
> //You say that there is no logical answer, but
> you are using all arguments
> from the very
> bhAShya and posing that itself as a pUrvapakSha. eg.,
> not being final is an Aropa that
> bhashyakAra makes on the pUrvapakshin's
> interpretation. If you are really interested,
> study Br. Up. 1.4.10 bhAShya.//
My question arose after studying Br. Up. bhAshya 1.4.7-10.
As I remember from your BVP post, you do not like to be told that you did
not understand AV/ mithyA, but you as easily say that the bhAShya on Gita
13.2 did not logically refute what is being asked! I wonder what is more
> Pratyaksha, anumAna and shAstra should go hand in hand, but I noticed that
> this is not the advaitic position. In advaita, shAstra trumps other two.
You notice wrong; all are hand in hand to understanding what is said in
Shruti. Shruti and pratyakSha et al have different areas of application,
else they would not be pramANa. Else one should able to talk of Ishvara
without shAstras, which is clearly not the case.
> > The statement of Des Cartes is not causal.
> It is inferential.
> //If so,
> as I said earlier, he should have said: I think, therefore I
> I exist.//
> It does not make any difference.
Then Descartes quote is irrelevant to the discussion as I said before.
> I interpolate my existence before and after sleep and conclude that
> something existed in deep sleep. This interpolation is impossible without
Who is "I" here for you? The I is one who makes interpolation possible.
The memory is jaDa, so it is impossible without consciousness as the basis
which is anusyUta, continuing in all states.
> I am talking of memory after waking up. No experience was collected during
> deep sleep. The memory remembers prior and post experiences and
> interpolates the intermediate existence. It does not need any consciousness
> during deep sleep.
The memory is a tool to remember, it does nothing! A sentient person
remembers the membered, recollects the collected, recognises the cognised,
using memory. To say that the memory needs no consciousness is like saying
that a stone needs nothing to know that it existed between yesterday and
> //You are confusing with
> consciousness that I talk of versus the
> consciousness which you refer to as
> "their" consciousness. If consciousness
> wasn't there, the person will not know that
> he is the same one who went
> into coma who
> came out. //
> This does not require consciousness.
By what source is this conclusion made? Science?
It just requires a properly functioning brain with memory before and after
> the episode.
Proper functioning brain may be put in chemicals and kept functioning,
but what is the use of that? The insentient is for the purpose of sentient.
> That is why I gave example of an epileptic seizure. Since there is
> transient loss of memory, the person does not even know that he had a
How does he know he is a person even?!
> It is better to understand a darshana from its proponents rather than from
> its opponents.
True, if my commitment was to understand the shUnyavAda darShana instead
of what Bhashyakara says to resolve doubts of pitfall-philosophies during
manana. Since you asked which text says that, please feel to share as to
what do shUnyavAdins say about consciousness in deep-sleep. I too would
like to know how you think that the bhAShya "misunderstood" the proponents
of shUnyavAda. Now, a piece of your own advice for you to follow; learn
Advaita Vedanta from a traditional proponent of Advaita Vedanta.
Consciousness is not there in deep sleep.
So consciousness being subject to coming and going is momentary. Pray tell
how do kShanikavAdins say any differently.
> Existence of a body and more importantly, the brain, which is the source
> of consciousness, is there in deep sleep.
And if you use Shruti along with pratyakSha and anumAna, how is असन्नेव स
भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् understood by you?
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