[Advaita-l] Two Advaitic verses with a profound combined purport
Raghav Kumar Dwivedula
raghavkumar00 at gmail.com
Mon Apr 15 13:45:23 EDT 2019
On Mon 15 Apr, 2019, 10:34 PM Raghav Kumar Dwivedula, <
raghavkumar00 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Namaste Venkatraghavan ji
> Apologies if I am intruding - there is this dvaita idea that "negation of
> objects seen in vyavahArika and negation of vyavahArika itself is only
> (possible) from a (higher) state of pAramArthika." I noticed Srinath ji
> always arrives at this kind of idea in every Advaita discussion, viz.,
> 'conclusion about mithyAtvam of the usual experience of duality, i.e.,
> vyAvahArika cannot be logically made from within the vyAvahArika domain'.
> But, going by this logic *any* conclusion or judgement *about* an entire
> state *taken as a whole* can only be made from a 'higher' or paramArthika
> state. By the same logic, according to dvaitins, we cannot even affirm
> dvaita or make any statement about the emperical state without transcending
> or operating from a higher pAramArthika state. So from a dvaita
> perspective, we are left without being able to reach any conclusion or
> niscaya about the reality or otherwise of the empirical state. So dvaita
> cannot be proved.
> Advaita does not have this problem with self-referential or reflexive
> statements - Advaita accepts that such statements can be valid in some
> contexts. This has been dealt with in many ways. Even the way pramAtRtvam
> is understood as mithyA through the antyaM pramANam has been explained in
> detail by showing that the way the triad of knower, knowledge and known ,
> operate in the case of viShaya GYAnam such as 'i see a tree' etc., is
> different from the case of knowledge such as 'i am Brahman and not just a
> limited pramAta'. The possibility and validity (prAmANyam) of such
> statements has been dealt with in vedAnta paribhAShA etc.
> It's dvaita that cannot be proved to be true when analyzed. Advaita stands
> in its own glory being self-evident once a person is taught the mahAvAkya,
> especially if study of Advaita happens before getting indoctrinated in to
> any theological systems.
> Just my २c
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] Two Advaitic verses with a profound combined
> From: Srinath Vedagarbha via Advaita-l
> To: Venkatraghavan S
> CC: Srinath Vedagarbha ,A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 5:16 AM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com>
> > This question has been addressed by Sri Madhusudana Sarasvati. The
> > niShedha of the niShedha need not necessarily lead to the affirmation of
> > the pratiyogi. In some cases it happens, but not always. Where the
> > of the pratiyogi and the negation of that negation are different, the
> > negation of the negation leads to the reality of pratiyogi.
> We are not talking of niShedha of the niShedha here. When you do the
> niShedha of this jagat, you may do another niShedha of this
> "jagat-niShedha" itself no problem, but from where that outer niShedha
> made? It can't be from vyavahAra as you agreed it will be negated. So, it
> has to be from pAramArtha only as I am saying.
> > The example given is where the nedam rajatam jnAna first arises and then
> > is later negated. The negation of negation leads to the affirmation of
> > rajata in this case.
> > But where both niShedha and pratiyogi are negated by the same negation -
> > on the basis of the same dharma (niShedhyatA avacChedaka dharma being the
> > same) - the negation of negation does not affirm the pratiyogi, because
> > pratiyogi has been negated by the very same negation.
> > The example given is where both horse-ness and cow-ness dharma-s are
> > negated by the same negation in an elephant. Where horse-ness is present
> > elephant-ness is absent. Similarly cow-ness. Thus if the basis of
> > is that everything that implies the absence of elephant-ness is to be
> > negated, by such a negation, both cow-ness and horse-ness are negated.
> > Similarly, in nyAya, when the dhvamsa (physical destruction) of the pot
> > occurs, it is held that both the pot and its atyantAbhAva are negated.
> > the negation of atyantAbhAva need not lead to the affirmation of the
> > pratiyogi, because the pratiyogi too is negated by the same dhvamsa
> It is not correct. When the pot is destroyed, its pradhvamAbhAva is
> affirmed. Your example is based on wrong argument because atyantAbhAva is
> negated in both the cases -- when pot was there and when pot was destroyed.
> There is no specialty to be used as hEtu in instances of pot destruction.
> Such usage suffers from ativyApti flaw.
> > In the standard example of the rope-snake illusion, the false perception
> >> of the snake and its subsequent negation are must be true at the end
> >> the illusion lapses. The man cannot deny that his perception of the
> >> and its negation itself was false.
> > If both the snake illusion and its negation are objects in a dream, they
> > are both sublated upon waking up. The negation of the snake is not real,
> > being an object in the dream. The negatability of the sarpa niShedha does
> > not confer reality to the snake, it too being an object in the dream.
> But that outer negation (negation of dream objects) has to be other
> (higher) state than the state itself being subject of negation. I am saying
> the same, negation of objects seen in vyavahArika and negation of
> vyavahArika itself is only from (higher) state of pAramArthika. MS's
> arguments are no arguments.
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