[Advaita-l] Two Advaitic verses with a profound combined purport

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Mon Apr 15 14:18:48 EDT 2019

Had forgotten to copy the list. Resending.

On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 4:02 PM Srinath Vedagarbha <svedagarbha at gmail.com>


On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 5:16 AM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

This question has been addressed by Sri Madhusudana Sarasvati. The niShedha
of the niShedha need not necessarily lead to the affirmation of the
pratiyogi. In some cases it happens, but not always. Where the negation of
the pratiyogi and the negation of that negation are different, the negation
of the  negation leads to the reality of pratiyogi.

We are not talking of niShedha of the niShedha here. When you do the
niShedha of this jagat, you may do another niShedha of this
"jagat-niShedha" itself no problem, but from where that outer niShedha
made? It can't be from vyavahAra as you agreed it will be negated. So, it
has to be from pAramArtha only as I am saying.

So what if the niShedha is negated? That is the argument being made - even
if the niShedha is prAtibhAsika like a dream negation of a dream object, it
can still do a bAdha. What remains after the niShedha is pAramArthika
advaita, because the niShedha negates all dvaita, including itself.

The example given is where the nedam rajatam jnAna first arises and then is
later negated. The negation of negation leads to the affirmation of the
rajata in this case.

But where both niShedha and pratiyogi are negated by the same negation - on
the basis of the same dharma (niShedhyatA avacChedaka dharma being the
same) - the negation of negation does not affirm the pratiyogi, because the
pratiyogi has been negated by the very same negation.

The example given is where both horse-ness and cow-ness dharma-s are
negated by the same negation in an elephant. Where horse-ness is present
elephant-ness is absent. Similarly cow-ness. Thus if the basis of negation
is that everything that implies the absence of elephant-ness is to be
negated, by such a negation, both cow-ness and horse-ness are negated.

Similarly, in nyAya, when the dhvamsa (physical destruction) of the pot
occurs, it is held that both the pot and its atyantAbhAva are negated. Thus
the negation of atyantAbhAva need not lead to the affirmation of the
pratiyogi, because the pratiyogi too is negated by the same dhvamsa

It is not correct. When the pot is destroyed, its pradhvamAbhAva is
affirmed. Your example is based on wrong argument because atyantAbhAva  is
negated in both the cases -- when pot was there and when pot was destroyed.
There is no specialty to be used as hEtu in instances of pot destruction.
Such usage suffers from ativyApti flaw.

That is why two examples were given. The first example is to show that with
the same niShedhyatA avacChedaka dharma it is possible to negate every
non-elephantness attribute. The second example is to show that the niShedha
does not have to be only of bhAva rUpa padArtha alone, even abhAva padArtha
can be negated. Now, you seem to think that atyantAbhAva is negated when
the pratiyogi is present. That is not correct.

In nyAya, it is very much possible to say that a pot and its atyantAbhAva
are present in the same locus. In the cognition "the pot is on the ground",
bhUtale ghaTa:, the naiyyAyika will argue that bhUtale samavAya sambandhena
ghaTasya atyAntAbhava: asti - the atyantAbhAva of the pot with a samavAya
sambandha with the ground is present. Now, both the pot and pot
atyantAbhAva exist in the same locus. When ghaTa dhvamsa occurs, it is
possible for me to argue that the very dhvamsa is the hetu for the niShedha
for both the pot and its atyantAbhAva.

In the standard example of the rope-snake illusion, the false perception of
the snake and its subsequent negation are must be true at the end after the
illusion lapses. The man cannot deny that his perception of the snake and
its negation itself was false.

If both the snake illusion and its negation are objects in a dream, they
are both sublated upon waking up. The negation of the snake is not real,
being an object in the dream. The negatability of the sarpa niShedha does
not confer reality to the snake, it too being an object in the dream.

But that outer negation (negation of dream objects) has to be other
(higher) state than the state itself being subject of negation. I am saying
the same, negation of objects seen in  vyavahArika  and negation of
vyavahArika itself is only from (higher) state of pAramArthika. MS's
arguments are no arguments.

The last statement is uncalled for and rude. Anyway, ignoring that, there
is no rule that says that the niShedha of niShedha requires that the outer
one, as you call it, has to have a higher order of reality than the second.
The sublatability of the outer negation has no bearing on its sublation of
the former. A rope can be mistaken for a snake. If there is a subsequent
illusion that it is a crack in the ground, that can still negate the snake
illusion. However, both the crack in the ground and the snake are equally

One may argue that such a negation is not bAdha, or Atyantika nivRtti. For
a jnAna to qualify as bAdhaka jnAna, it must be a vyAvrittAkAra jnAna
revealing the adhiShThAna of the bhrama. Brahman is the adhiShThAna of
everything - including both the jagat and brahma jnAna, thus by that one
brahma jnAna, both the jagat and brahmajnAna itself are sublated.



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