[Advaita-l] Is difference known by perception?

[Venkatraghavan S]

Errata:
1) निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: in the KKK verse should be निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै:

सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||

2) The first sentence in the third paragraph above the aforementioned verse
should be (missing words in the original highlighted):

"To avoid this, *let us assume* that the difference exists, but there is no
need to know it. That is, the difference-cognition is different to the
difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but
there is no need for another cognition to reveal such a difference.
However, then what is to say that the cognition has difference as its
object and therefore it is valid?"

Kind regards,
Venkatraghavan




On Fri, 3 May 2019, 12:11 Venkatraghavan S, <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste,
> One of the important concepts in advaita is the absolute identity of
> everything. There is no difference whatsoever. The basis for this,
> according to advaita, is the shruti, which talks of sarvAtmabhAva - the one
> principle that is all - and denies any kind of multiplicity and difference
> (नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, नात्र काचन भिदास्ति, etc).
>
> Other schools of philosophy argue that this universal identity is
> incorrect - arguing that difference is known either directly through
> perception, or through inference, or by presumption (arthApatti). In this
> context, an interesting discussion arises in the Advaita Siddhi, borrowing
> heavily from the ideas outlined in the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya of Sriharsha.
>
> We will consider the first proposition - that difference is known through
> perception - in this email.
>
> The basic argument of other schools is that if the two objects, whose
> difference we are going to consider for discussion, are known through
> perception, the difference also must be known through perception.
>
> One sub-group within this view holds that the knowledge of the object is
> also the knowledge of the difference of the object versus other objects -
> that is, svarUpa jnAna itself is bheda jnAna. Another group holds that the
> knowledge of difference is different, arriving simultaneously, or
> subsequent to the knowledge of the object.
>
> Is svarUpa jnAna bheda jnAna?
>
> The advaitin's argument is that the cognition of difference cannot be the
> same as the cognition of the object. If that were to be the case, there
> would be no erroneous cognition of identity at all. When anyone sees a
> shell, they would see the difference of shell with everything else in the
> world. The erroneous cognition of the identity of silver with shell would
> never occur.
>
> In the prAbhAkara school of pUrva mImAmsa, which believes in the akhyAti
> theory of error, there is no error at all in the cognition "this is silver"
> when a shell is seen. Rather, they hold that there are two cognitions -
> one, a perception of the proximate shell as "this", and another, the memory
> of "silver", triggered by the shininess of the shell. Because both
> cognitions arise temporally close to each other, the seer does not
> differentiate between perception and memory, and conflates the two into the
> cognition  "this is silver". A perception and memory are different and when
> they are both seen, their difference should also be automatically seen, so
> why does the person conflate the two?
>
> Thus, there are instances where the absence of the perception of
> difference  leads to a particular activity. If difference were universally
> perceived whenever an object was perceived, the activities dependent on the
> lack of perception of difference, would not occur.
>
> Moreover, even the group that holds that the perception of the object is
> the perception of difference has to admit that the perception of a pot as
> endowed with potness (ghaTatva prakAraka ghaTa jnAna) and the perception of
> difference as endowed with difference-ness (bhedatva prakAraka bheda jnAna)
> are different.
>
> Does svarUpa jnAna lead to bheda jnAna?
>
> Coming to the second sub-group - this group holds that the perception of
> difference is different from the perception of the object, but it
> necessarily occurs after the perception of the object.
>
> The advaitin's argument is that such a view leads to infinite regress.
> Everyone admits that as a rule, the perception of difference requires the
> perception of the objects as its cause. This perception of difference will
> have to be different from the perception of the objects, because if it is
> identical, we will have to say that perception of difference causes itself,
> which would be logically flawed.
>
> Now, the shruti says that all objects are identical. The opponent argues
> that that is not the case, because there is an independent perception of
> difference between the pot and the cloth, and that perception overrules the
> shruti.
>
> However, what reveals that such a perception is different from the
> anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the pot and the cloth, whose difference the
> difference-cognition reveals)? In the absence of any other cognition
> revealing that difference, the shruti which reveals identity will prevail,
> and that difference-cognition ends up identical with the object pair. If it
> ends up identical with the objects, this suffers from the same flaw
> identified where bhedajnAna was the same as svarUpa jnAna.
>
> Thus, in order for that difference-cognition (say cognition-1) to reveal
> difference, another difference-cognition (cognition-2) will have to reveal
> the difference (difference-2) between cognition-1, its object
> (difference-1), and the anuyogi-pratiyogi-pair for difference-1. For
> cognition-2 to reveal difference-2, we need cognition-3, and so on and so
> forth, leading to infinite regress.
>
> There would be no possibility of sleep, or the cognition of anything else.
>
> To avoid this, it may be argued, that such an infinite regress is not
> necessary, and that at some point, there is a final difference-cognition
> that reveals the difference between cognition-(n-1) and cognition-(n-2).
>
> However, there is no other cognition that will reveal the difference
> between the final difference-cognition (cognition-n), difference-n, and its
> anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the previous pair of difference cognitions). That
> final difference-cognition is therefore defenceless against the shruti
> revealed cognition of identity, and so, it will end up identical with all
> of the above. Similarly, each difference-cognition becomes identical with
> its previous pair of difference-cognitions, and their difference. This goes
> all the way back to the first difference-cognition, which becomes identical
> with the pot, the cloth and the difference between the two.
>
> Thus there is no independent perception of difference that is not
> identical with the pot and the cloth themselves. That being the case, there
> is no cognition to overrule the shruti which teaches that there is no
> difference at all, and the pot and the cloth end up identical.  Not just
> that pair, but that is true for every pair of objects.
>
> Here, it may be argued that even if the difference-cognition is identical
> to the difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals,
> it can still reveal difference. However, by this, it follows that the pair
> of objects themselves are identical (because each is identical with the
> difference-cognition). That being so, the cognition is both revealing the
> difference between the object pair and their identity. In other words, the
> cognition is overruling itself.
>
> To avoid this that the difference exists, but there is no need to know it.
> That is, the difference-cognition is different to the difference and to the
> pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but there is no need for
> another cognition to reveal such a difference. However, then what is to say
> that the cognition has difference as its object and therefore it is valid?
>
> Thus, the position that difference is perceived is invalidated.
>
> Sriharsha invokes a military example from the nitishAstra in the
> khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya to illustrate this.
>
> सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
> निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||
>
> The king desirous of victory has to face up to a series of foes - starting
> from the enemy king, his friends, the king's secondary enemy, their friends
> etc. and all the way to the पार्ष्णिग्राह, the final line of defence, foot
> soliders. Even if the king has traveled very far and has defeated everyone
> else, if he is defeated by the last man standing, he suffers a defeat.
> Similarly, the series of cognitions (required to overrule shruti) may
> travel very far, and prove many things, but the entire sequence gets
> overthrown by the advaita shruti in the end.
>
> We will consider a refutation of the view that difference is known by
> inference and presumption separately.
>
> Kind regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
>