[Advaita-l] Is difference known by perception?

[kuntimaddi sadananda]

Venkatraghavanji - PraNAms
Not sure the essence of the Advaitic position. Swarupa jnaanam comes in at the absolute level, not at the transactional level. Pramaanas other than Vedanta mostly operate at the transactional level where objects are perceived or inferred. 
Perception of an object does involve the perception of the differences between the objects too; since the perception of an object involves the perception via senses that measures the reflected attributes of the objects. The objects do differ since their attributive content differs.
The confusion arises taking the attributive objects represents their essential swaruupam. They are only real at the transactional stage and the scriptural statement - neha naa naa asti kinchana -refers to their essence at the absolute level. Since the scripture says - vaachaarambhanam vikaaraH naamadheyam - and sarvam khalu idam brahma. Even from the objective science point everything is nothing but electrons, protons, and neutrons at some level. Hence neha naa naasti kinchan can apply at that level too! 
The arguments of the other darshanikas involve getting confused between the reality at the absolute level vs the reality at the transactional level. 
Even the silver in the shell is real for the perceiver at that time until he further enquires. Then he recognizes the silver that he saw was not real even though shell looks silvery even after he picks up. The silvery attribute is still there but it belongs to the shell and not real. Well, all that glitters is not gold - there is Eureka Eureka story too.
Just could not resist.
Hari Om!Sadananda

 

    On Saturday, May 4, 2019, 4:40:51 AM EDT, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:  
 
 Errata:
1) निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: in the KKK verse should be निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै:

सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||

2) The first sentence in the third paragraph above the aforementioned verse
should be (missing words in the original highlighted):

"To avoid this, *let us assume* that the difference exists, but there is no
need to know it. That is, the difference-cognition is different to the
difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but
there is no need for another cognition to reveal such a difference.
However, then what is to say that the cognition has difference as its
object and therefore it is valid?"

Kind regards,
Venkatraghavan




On Fri, 3 May 2019, 12:11 Venkatraghavan S, <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste,
> One of the important concepts in advaita is the absolute identity of
> everything. There is no difference whatsoever. The basis for this,
> according to advaita, is the shruti, which talks of sarvAtmabhAva - the one
> principle that is all - and denies any kind of multiplicity and difference
> (नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, नात्र काचन भिदास्ति, etc).
>
> Other schools of philosophy argue that this universal identity is
> incorrect - arguing that difference is known either directly through
> perception, or through inference, or by presumption (arthApatti). In this
> context, an interesting discussion arises in the Advaita Siddhi, borrowing
> heavily from the ideas outlined in the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya of Sriharsha.
>
> We will consider the first proposition - that difference is known through
> perception - in this email.
>
> The basic argument of other schools is that if the two objects, whose
> difference we are going to consider for discussion, are known through
> perception, the difference also must be known through perception.
>
> One sub-group within this view holds that the knowledge of the object is
> also the knowledge of the difference of the object versus other objects -
> that is, svarUpa jnAna itself is bheda jnAna. Another group holds that the
> knowledge of difference is different, arriving simultaneously, or
> subsequent to the knowledge of the object.
>
> Is svarUpa jnAna bheda jnAna?
>
> The advaitin's argument is that the cognition of difference cannot be the
> same as the cognition of the object. If that were to be the case, there
> would be no erroneous cognition of identity at all. When anyone sees a
> shell, they would see the difference of shell with everything else in the
> world. The erroneous cognition of the identity of silver with shell would
> never occur.
>
> In the prAbhAkara school of pUrva mImAmsa, which believes in the akhyAti
> theory of error, there is no error at all in the cognition "this is silver"
> when a shell is seen. Rather, they hold that there are two cognitions -
> one, a perception of the proximate shell as "this", and another, the memory
> of "silver", triggered by the shininess of the shell. Because both
> cognitions arise temporally close to each other, the seer does not
> differentiate between perception and memory, and conflates the two into the
> cognition  "this is silver". A perception and memory are different and when
> they are both seen, their difference should also be automatically seen, so
> why does the person conflate the two?
>
> Thus, there are instances where the absence of the perception of
> difference  leads to a particular activity. If difference were universally
> perceived whenever an object was perceived, the activities dependent on the
> lack of perception of difference, would not occur.
>
> Moreover, even the group that holds that the perception of the object is
> the perception of difference has to admit that the perception of a pot as
> endowed with potness (ghaTatva prakAraka ghaTa jnAna) and the perception of
> difference as endowed with difference-ness (bhedatva prakAraka bheda jnAna)
> are different.
>
> Does svarUpa jnAna lead to bheda jnAna?
>
> Coming to the second sub-group - this group holds that the perception of
> difference is different from the perception of the object, but it
> necessarily occurs after the perception of the object.
>
> The advaitin's argument is that such a view leads to infinite regress.
> Everyone admits that as a rule, the perception of difference requires the
> perception of the objects as its cause. This perception of difference will
> have to be different from the perception of the objects, because if it is
> identical, we will have to say that perception of difference causes itself,
> which would be logically flawed.
>
> Now, the shruti says that all objects are identical. The opponent argues
> that that is not the case, because there is an independent perception of
> difference between the pot and the cloth, and that perception overrules the
> shruti.
>
> However, what reveals that such a perception is different from the
> anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the pot and the cloth, whose difference the
> difference-cognition reveals)? In the absence of any other cognition
> revealing that difference, the shruti which reveals identity will prevail,
> and that difference-cognition ends up identical with the object pair. If it
> ends up identical with the objects, this suffers from the same flaw
> identified where bhedajnAna was the same as svarUpa jnAna.
>
> Thus, in order for that difference-cognition (say cognition-1) to reveal
> difference, another difference-cognition (cognition-2) will have to reveal
> the difference (difference-2) between cognition-1, its object
> (difference-1), and the anuyogi-pratiyogi-pair for difference-1. For
> cognition-2 to reveal difference-2, we need cognition-3, and so on and so
> forth, leading to infinite regress.
>
> There would be no possibility of sleep, or the cognition of anything else.
>
> To avoid this, it may be argued, that such an infinite regress is not
> necessary, and that at some point, there is a final difference-cognition
> that reveals the difference between cognition-(n-1) and cognition-(n-2).
>
> However, there is no other cognition that will reveal the difference
> between the final difference-cognition (cognition-n), difference-n, and its
> anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the previous pair of difference cognitions). That
> final difference-cognition is therefore defenceless against the shruti
> revealed cognition of identity, and so, it will end up identical with all
> of the above. Similarly, each difference-cognition becomes identical with
> its previous pair of difference-cognitions, and their difference. This goes
> all the way back to the first difference-cognition, which becomes identical
> with the pot, the cloth and the difference between the two.
>
> Thus there is no independent perception of difference that is not
> identical with the pot and the cloth themselves. That being the case, there
> is no cognition to overrule the shruti which teaches that there is no
> difference at all, and the pot and the cloth end up identical.  Not just
> that pair, but that is true for every pair of objects.
>
> Here, it may be argued that even if the difference-cognition is identical
> to the difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals,
> it can still reveal difference. However, by this, it follows that the pair
> of objects themselves are identical (because each is identical with the
> difference-cognition). That being so, the cognition is both revealing the
> difference between the object pair and their identity. In other words, the
> cognition is overruling itself.
>
> To avoid this that the difference exists, but there is no need to know it.
> That is, the difference-cognition is different to the difference and to the
> pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but there is no need for
> another cognition to reveal such a difference. However, then what is to say
> that the cognition has difference as its object and therefore it is valid?
>
> Thus, the position that difference is perceived is invalidated.
>
> Sriharsha invokes a military example from the nitishAstra in the
> khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya to illustrate this.
>
> सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
> निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||
>
> The king desirous of victory has to face up to a series of foes - starting
> from the enemy king, his friends, the king's secondary enemy, their friends
> etc. and all the way to the पार्ष्णिग्राह, the final line of defence, foot
> soliders. Even if the king has traveled very far and has defeated everyone
> else, if he is defeated by the last man standing, he suffers a defeat.
> Similarly, the series of cognitions (required to overrule shruti) may
> travel very far, and prove many things, but the entire sequence gets
> overthrown by the advaita shruti in the end.
>
> We will consider a refutation of the view that difference is known by
> inference and presumption separately.
>
> Kind regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
>
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