[Advaita-l] Is difference known by perception?

[Venkatraghavan S]

Thank you for your comments Sadaji - agreed.

The essence of the advaita position, which you articulated in your email
also, is that while difference is acceptable on a transactional level, it
does not have pAramArthika satyam.


Regards
Venkatraghavan

On Sat, 4 May 2019, 12:49 kuntimaddi sadananda, <kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com>
wrote:

> Venkatraghavanji - PraNAms
>
> Not sure the essence of the Advaitic position. Swarupa jnaanam comes in at
> the absolute level, not at the transactional level. Pramaanas other than
> Vedanta mostly operate at the transactional level where objects are
> perceived or inferred.
>
> Perception of an object does involve the perception of the differences
> between the objects too; since the perception of an object involves the
> perception via senses that measures the reflected attributes of the
> objects. The objects do differ since their attributive content differs.
>
> The confusion arises taking the attributive objects represents their
> essential swaruupam. They are only real at the transactional stage and the
> scriptural statement - neha naa naa asti kinchana -refers to their essence
> at the absolute level. Since the scripture says - vaachaarambhanam vikaaraH
> naamadheyam - and sarvam khalu idam brahma. Even from the objective science
> point everything is nothing but electrons, protons, and neutrons at some
> level. Hence neha naa naasti kinchan can apply at that level too!
>
> The arguments of the other darshanikas involve getting confused between
> the reality at the absolute level vs the reality at the transactional
> level.
>
> Even the silver in the shell is real for the perceiver at that time until
> he further enquires. Then he recognizes the silver that he saw was not real
> even though shell looks silvery even after he picks up. The silvery
> attribute is still there but it belongs to the shell and not real.
> Well, all that glitters is not gold - there is Eureka Eureka story too.
>
> Just could not resist.
>
> Hari Om!
> Sadananda
>
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019, 4:40:51 AM EDT, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>
> Errata:
> 1) निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: in the KKK verse should be निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै:
>
> सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
> निवृत्तावद्वयाम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||
>
> 2) The first sentence in the third paragraph above the aforementioned verse
> should be (missing words in the original highlighted):
>
> "To avoid this, *let us assume* that the difference exists, but there is no
> need to know it. That is, the difference-cognition is different to the
> difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but
> there is no need for another cognition to reveal such a difference.
> However, then what is to say that the cognition has difference as its
> object and therefore it is valid?"
>
> Kind regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, 3 May 2019, 12:11 Venkatraghavan S, <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Namaste,
> > One of the important concepts in advaita is the absolute identity of
> > everything. There is no difference whatsoever. The basis for this,
> > according to advaita, is the shruti, which talks of sarvAtmabhAva - the
> one
> > principle that is all - and denies any kind of multiplicity and
> difference
> > (नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, नात्र काचन भिदास्ति, etc).
> >
> > Other schools of philosophy argue that this universal identity is
> > incorrect - arguing that difference is known either directly through
> > perception, or through inference, or by presumption (arthApatti). In this
> > context, an interesting discussion arises in the Advaita Siddhi,
> borrowing
> > heavily from the ideas outlined in the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya of Sriharsha.
> >
> > We will consider the first proposition - that difference is known through
> > perception - in this email.
> >
> > The basic argument of other schools is that if the two objects, whose
> > difference we are going to consider for discussion, are known through
> > perception, the difference also must be known through perception.
> >
> > One sub-group within this view holds that the knowledge of the object is
> > also the knowledge of the difference of the object versus other objects -
> > that is, svarUpa jnAna itself is bheda jnAna. Another group holds that
> the
> > knowledge of difference is different, arriving simultaneously, or
> > subsequent to the knowledge of the object.
> >
> > Is svarUpa jnAna bheda jnAna?
> >
> > The advaitin's argument is that the cognition of difference cannot be the
> > same as the cognition of the object. If that were to be the case, there
> > would be no erroneous cognition of identity at all. When anyone sees a
> > shell, they would see the difference of shell with everything else in the
> > world. The erroneous cognition of the identity of silver with shell would
> > never occur.
> >
> > In the prAbhAkara school of pUrva mImAmsa, which believes in the akhyAti
> > theory of error, there is no error at all in the cognition "this is
> silver"
> > when a shell is seen. Rather, they hold that there are two cognitions -
> > one, a perception of the proximate shell as "this", and another, the
> memory
> > of "silver", triggered by the shininess of the shell. Because both
> > cognitions arise temporally close to each other, the seer does not
> > differentiate between perception and memory, and conflates the two into
> the
> > cognition  "this is silver". A perception and memory are different and
> when
> > they are both seen, their difference should also be automatically seen,
> so
> > why does the person conflate the two?
> >
> > Thus, there are instances where the absence of the perception of
> > difference  leads to a particular activity. If difference were
> universally
> > perceived whenever an object was perceived, the activities dependent on
> the
> > lack of perception of difference, would not occur.
> >
> > Moreover, even the group that holds that the perception of the object is
> > the perception of difference has to admit that the perception of a pot as
> > endowed with potness (ghaTatva prakAraka ghaTa jnAna) and the perception
> of
> > difference as endowed with difference-ness (bhedatva prakAraka bheda
> jnAna)
> > are different.
> >
> > Does svarUpa jnAna lead to bheda jnAna?
> >
> > Coming to the second sub-group - this group holds that the perception of
> > difference is different from the perception of the object, but it
> > necessarily occurs after the perception of the object.
> >
> > The advaitin's argument is that such a view leads to infinite regress.
> > Everyone admits that as a rule, the perception of difference requires the
> > perception of the objects as its cause. This perception of difference
> will
> > have to be different from the perception of the objects, because if it is
> > identical, we will have to say that perception of difference causes
> itself,
> > which would be logically flawed.
> >
> > Now, the shruti says that all objects are identical. The opponent argues
> > that that is not the case, because there is an independent perception of
> > difference between the pot and the cloth, and that perception overrules
> the
> > shruti.
> >
> > However, what reveals that such a perception is different from the
> > anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the pot and the cloth, whose difference the
> > difference-cognition reveals)? In the absence of any other cognition
> > revealing that difference, the shruti which reveals identity will
> prevail,
> > and that difference-cognition ends up identical with the object pair. If
> it
> > ends up identical with the objects, this suffers from the same flaw
> > identified where bhedajnAna was the same as svarUpa jnAna.
> >
> > Thus, in order for that difference-cognition (say cognition-1) to reveal
> > difference, another difference-cognition (cognition-2) will have to
> reveal
> > the difference (difference-2) between cognition-1, its object
> > (difference-1), and the anuyogi-pratiyogi-pair for difference-1. For
> > cognition-2 to reveal difference-2, we need cognition-3, and so on and so
> > forth, leading to infinite regress.
> >
> > There would be no possibility of sleep, or the cognition of anything
> else.
> >
> > To avoid this, it may be argued, that such an infinite regress is not
> > necessary, and that at some point, there is a final difference-cognition
> > that reveals the difference between cognition-(n-1) and cognition-(n-2).
> >
> > However, there is no other cognition that will reveal the difference
> > between the final difference-cognition (cognition-n), difference-n, and
> its
> > anuyogi-pratiyogi pair (the previous pair of difference cognitions). That
> > final difference-cognition is therefore defenceless against the shruti
> > revealed cognition of identity, and so, it will end up identical with all
> > of the above. Similarly, each difference-cognition becomes identical with
> > its previous pair of difference-cognitions, and their difference. This
> goes
> > all the way back to the first difference-cognition, which becomes
> identical
> > with the pot, the cloth and the difference between the two.
> >
> > Thus there is no independent perception of difference that is not
> > identical with the pot and the cloth themselves. That being the case,
> there
> > is no cognition to overrule the shruti which teaches that there is no
> > difference at all, and the pot and the cloth end up identical.  Not just
> > that pair, but that is true for every pair of objects.
> >
> > Here, it may be argued that even if the difference-cognition is identical
> > to the difference and to the pair of objects whose difference it reveals,
> > it can still reveal difference. However, by this, it follows that the
> pair
> > of objects themselves are identical (because each is identical with the
> > difference-cognition). That being so, the cognition is both revealing the
> > difference between the object pair and their identity. In other words,
> the
> > cognition is overruling itself.
> >
> > To avoid this that the difference exists, but there is no need to know
> it.
> > That is, the difference-cognition is different to the difference and to
> the
> > pair of objects whose difference it reveals, but there is no need for
> > another cognition to reveal such a difference. However, then what is to
> say
> > that the cognition has difference as its object and therefore it is
> valid?
> >
> > Thus, the position that difference is perceived is invalidated.
> >
> > Sriharsha invokes a military example from the nitishAstra in the
> > khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya to illustrate this.
> >
> > सुदूरधावनश्रान्ता बाधबुद्धिपरम्परा |
> > निवृत्तावद्व्याम्नायै: पार्ष्णिग्राहैर्विजीयते ||
> >
> > The king desirous of victory has to face up to a series of foes -
> starting
> > from the enemy king, his friends, the king's secondary enemy, their
> friends
> > etc. and all the way to the पार्ष्णिग्राह, the final line of defence,
> foot
> > soliders. Even if the king has traveled very far and has defeated
> everyone
> > else, if he is defeated by the last man standing, he suffers a defeat.
> > Similarly, the series of cognitions (required to overrule shruti) may
> > travel very far, and prove many things, but the entire sequence gets
> > overthrown by the advaita shruti in the end.
> >
> > We will consider a refutation of the view that difference is known by
> > inference and presumption separately.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> > Venkatraghavan
> >
> >
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