[Advaita-l] ​Re: [advaitin] A talk on avidyA by Manjushree

[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Dear Michael ji,

She has again not understood traditional advaita teachings or
misinterpreting them. No one argues that mūlāvidyā exists as long as the
world is perceptible, In fact the world does not exist (apart from brahman
as a separate reality ) even though it is perceptible.  mūlāvidyā  is
completely destroyed for jnaani / jivanmukta with baadhita anuvritti of
praarabdha karma accounting for the vyavahaara of the jeevnmukta as a
sampradaayavit, shrotriya, brahmanishta Guru. The baadhita anuvritti of
praarabdha which is accepted by Bhashyakara in Br. Up 1.4.7 or BSBh 4.1.15
is called as avidya-lesha by some vyākhyānakāras which is not the same as
mūlāvidyā.

The videhamukti will anyway come as it may happen at the end of the present
body or even another body may be taken up by the jnaani as mentioned in
BrSu 3.3.32  यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ॥
The jeevanmukti is what is sought after and that is denied by SSS
interpretation of Bhashya and Sruti.

Her statement "for the vyākhyānakāra-s, the “apavāda” occurs only in
videhamukti" is also not proper understanding of traditional vedanta.
The apavāda
is here and now and the teaching is 'You are Brahman' and not 'You will
become Brahman'.

with love and prayers,
Jaishankar


On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 8:29 PM Michael Chandra Cohen via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> I took up with Smt. Manjushree Hegde and she was kind enough to clarify as
> follows: ""Let me reframe Jaishankarji’s argument for clarity’s sake:
> Very clearly, Jaishankarji’s points out that every vyākhyānakāra argues
> that mūlāvidyā exists as long as the world is perceptible, and does not
> exist ultimately (pāramārthika-standpoint). No vyākhyānakāra argues that it
> exists ultimately (for this would negate “advaita”).
> Jaishankarji also pointed out that the world appears for a jīvan-mukta too
> – he eats, sleeps, and moves like any ordinary person; he addresses the
> questions of sādhaka-s, and sometimes, his body suffers diseases like
> cancer, etc. According to the vyākhyānakāra-s, the only way to account for
> the jivanmukta who exists in this world, and participates in it, is
> mūlāvidyā.
> Thus, according to the vyākhyānakāra-s, mūlāvidyā (the cause) shares the
> nature of the world (the effect) – it is non-existent (ultimately); but as
> long as the world appears, its operation is in play.
> I hope I have not misrepresented the pūrvapakṣa here? If I have, then I’m
> entirely willing to correct myself.
> Let me articulate Swamiiji’s position.
> According to the above arguments, we must accept that a jivanmukta – while
> he understands that the world is only a play — operates in it on the basis
> of mūlāvidyā. It is only after videhamukti that the “play” entirely
> disappears. What is the pramāṇa for the statement that the play will,
> indeed, disappear after videhamukti? Only śruti.
> And this, right here, is Swamiji’s problem. When/if we accept mūlāvidyā, we
> cannot rely on anubhava pramāṇa (whose anubhava, what pramāṇa?); we must
> resort to “argument from authority”— śruti pramāṇa. And this cuts across
> the very foundation of advaita-vedānta, and reduces it to another school of
> philosophy that demands faith/belief for it to be true.
> Advaita vedānta stands on anubhava-pramāṇa, it does not require śruti for
> it to be true. Its sanctity lies in the fact that it is verifiable
> here&now.
> If mūlāvidyā exists in the three states of jāgrat, svapna and suṣupti— and
> it also exists in a jivanmukta — and only does not exist only in
> videhamukti, how is this verifiable in my experience?
> ---------------------
> When the vyākhyānakāra argues for a mūlāvidyā that exists in suṣupti and in
> a jivanmukta, on what basis is this statement made? On indriyānubhava.
> Which belongs to the field of avidyā. Conclusions that are drawn using
> faulty instruments can only be faulty.
> I’d be happy to elaborate on this point if it is required.
> -----------------------
> I agree that vyākhyānakāra-s rely on adhyāropāpavāda to elucidate their
> points— but the application of the method is carried out differently by
> them.
> Very beautifully, Jaishankarji pointed out that the vyākhyānakāra-s teach
> that kārya-kāraṇa is only an adhyāropa, and ultimately (from the
> pāramārthika-standpoint), the labels stand negated, and this is apavāda.
> Yes, for the vyākhyānakāra-s, the “apavāda” occurs only in videhamukti. The
> adhyāropa is ontologically accepted until such a moment occurs. This
> understanding is vastly different from adhyāropāpavāda as a strictly
> pedagogical technique that by śruti is used to draw the sādhaka-s attention
> to his ever-existing anubhava. Swamiji takes the latter position, and the
> traditional advaitins take the former.
> I could have perhaps articulated this better in my talk. My apologies."
>
>