[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Kilogram not yet concluded after all

[Venkatraghavan S]

Wishing all members a very Happy Ganesh Chaturthi. I pray to Lord Ganesha
to remove all the obstacles to our moksha.

Dear Michael ji,
Re
"I repeat my issue: what causes the cause? If mulavidya is adhyasta,
something had to bring it about."

Why? Do you agree that superimposition always needs a cause? What is the
cause for beginningless superimposition for you?

If you say that the absence of knowledge causes adhyAsa to occur - ie
knowledge not rising causes adhyAsa to occur - how can absence cause
anything? Shankara has refuted such an eventuality in several places. In
the gItA bhAShya for example, he argues that the failure to perform
nitya-karma, mandatory rituals, cannot cause the incurrence of sin, on the
grounds that the absence of a thing (a failure to perform a ritual being an
absence of performance) can never cause any outcome. So how can the absence
of knowledge cause superimposition?

To avoid this, you also have to admit that absence of knowledge does not
produce adhyAsa. What is the role of the absence of knowledge vis a vis
adhyAsa then in your system? You will necessarily have to admit that the
role of the absence of knowledge wrt adhyAsa is *as a precondition*, not as
a cause. That is, for adhyAsa to occur, jnAna must be absent.

That is true for us too.

We too say that mUlAvidyA is adhyasta so long as jnAna hasn't arisen. That
is, when jnAna is absent, mUlAvidyA is *superimposed.* After jnAna arises,
one realises that mUlAvidyA that adhyAsa is destroyed and we realise it
never existed in any of the three periods of time.

As your precondition of superimposition  - that jnAna is absent - is met in
the case of mUlAvidyA's superimposition, what is the untenability in saying
that mUlAvidyA is superimposed when jnAna has not arisen? When you do not
stipulate the "absence of jnAna" as a cause of adhyAsa, but only as its
precondition, what is the untenability here in saying that when jnAna is
absent, mUlAvidyA is also adhyasta? Why are you asking us to demonstrate an
external cause for avidyA's adhyAsa, when you do not admit an external
cause yourself for adhyAsa?

We hold that the superimposition of a beginningless ajnAna does not need a
cause distinct to it.

ajnAna is instrumental in its own superimposition. We have also provided
examples of this reflexive behaviour in the world.

e.g. 1) A list of all lists must necessarily list itself too. If that is
not admitted, then it would not be a list of *all* lists.

Similarly, according to us, ajnAna is the cause of *all* adhyAsa. So it
necessarily follows that it is a cause of its own adhyAsa too.

Further, moksha requires the cessation of *all* adhyAsa and for *all*
adhyAsa to be removed by jnAna, every adhyAsa must have a foundational
defect of the nature of ajnAna, i.e. one that is capable of being removed
by jnAna. jnAna can only remove ajnAna.

If I have double vision that makes me see two moons, knowing that there is
only one moon is not going to stop me from seeing two moons. I may know
that there is only moon because of right knowledge, but that doesn't solve
my problem. The vision of the second moon - the incorrect visual cognition
- is not going to stop until the foundational defect in the eye is cleared.
The foundational defect that caused the incorrect visual cognition in this
case is not capable of being removed by jnAna, so jnAna does not stop me
from seeing the second moon until I have had treatment for the eye.

The foundational defect in the case of adhyAsa / samsAra is capable of
being removed by jnAna, because it happens to be ajnAna.

If ajnAna wasn't the cause of adhyAsa, how would jnAna remove adhyAsa?

If ajnAna wasn't adhyasta, it would be real and wouldn't be removed by
knowledge.

e.g. 2) The difference between a pot and the cloth is also different to the
pot and the cloth - it doesn't need a second difference to establish its
own (i.e. the difference's) difference with the pot and the cloth - if that
is not admitted, it will lead to infinite regress.

e.g. 3) When we hold that Brahman is the substratum for everything in the
world and Narada asks what is the substratum of Brahman, to which
Sanatkumara says  स्वे महिम्नि यदि वा न महिम्नीति - Brahman supports
itself. Or you can say nothing else supports it.

You cannot seek the substratum of the substratum itself. It supports itself
by itself.

Similarly, you cannot seek the cause of avidyA's superimposition. It
superimposes itself by itself. Or you can say nothing else superimposes it.

*Why call it mUla then?*
If you are objecting to calling it "mUla" avidyA, Bhaskar ji's previous
email translates Sri SSS' writings in Kannada to English. He writes -

" since the *unmanifested (avyAkruta) names and forms is the cause (seed)
for the perceived world of duality*, *if it is called as “moolaavidyA” then
that opinion is not unacceptable to me because that avyAkruta names and
forms is the main reason for everything hence it can be labelled as ‘mUla’*.
But if anyone comes up with the theories like : it is not adhyasta
(superimposed) or not avidyAkalpita (kalpita-imagined, misconception due to
ignorance etc. then I would never accept such stand as that stand is
shruti, yukti and bhAshya viruddha. "

This is why also we call moolAvidyA as mUla-avidyA. If Sri SSS has no
problems calling that mUla for those reasons, what is the issue here?

Also please note that it is accepted within the advaita sampradAya that
there are six beginningless entities (ShadasmAkam anAdayah) - 1) jIva, 2)
Ishvara, 3) the difference between the two, 4) Brahman (pure
consciousness), 5) avidyA and the 6) connection between the two, i.e
adhyAsa. There is no need to go looking for causes for any of these,
because they are beginningless.

Kind regards,
Venkatraghavan


On Sat, 7 Sept 2024, 04:32 Michael Chandra Cohen, <
michaelchandra108 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Sudhanshuji,
>
> //Anything which is mithyA is adhyasta. MUlAvidyA is mithyA, hence it is
> adhyasta//
> I repeat my issue: what causes the cause? If mulavidya is adhyasta,
> something had to bring it about.
>
>
>